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I.  Introduction 
 
Dictator games first caught the attention of economists because non-cooperative 
game theory, assuming income-maximizing behavior, failed to predict the 
outcomes commonly observed in these experiments (Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler, 1986; Camerer and Thaler, 1995).  In this two-person game, the “dictator” 
has to decide what share s∈[0,1] of his endowment he wants to pass on to a 
passive second player.  While standard theory predicts s=0, at least one third of all 
subjects make positive offers.  This result holds even in double-blind experiments 
which are less conducive to “fair” behavior than earlier experimental setups 
(Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994).1  Eckel and Grossman (1996), 
using the same double-blind design, show that donations significantly increase if 
the recipient is generally agreed to be “deserving,” suggesting that a desire to be 
fair is an important aspect of the game. 
In view of these findings, it comes as no surprise that dictator game 
experiments have become an important vehicle to study individuals’ “taste for 
fairness” (for surveys, see Roth (1995) and Konow (2003)).  In theoretical work, 
the results from dictator experiments serve as a stepping stone to build models 
that are consistent with individual behavior in broad classes of games.  For 
instance, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) use results from dictator games to analyze 
how subjects resolve the trade-off between pecuniary gains and relative pay-off.  
In their view, dictator game results are “basic to an understanding of many other 
games.” 
Given the prominence of dictator game experiments, this paper sets out to 
further investigate the robustness of these experimental results.  We present new 
evidence on dictator games with wider choice sets.  As in the standard game, our 
dictators choose a share s∈[0,1] of their endowment that they wish to pass on.  In 
addition, they also have the option to purchase lottery tickets.  The expected value 
of playing the lottery is negative, and we show that most subjects prefer not to 
purchase tickets outside the context of a dictator game.  However, when both the 
lottery and the dictator game constitute the choice set, we observe two interesting 
changes in the behavior.  First, the fraction of subjects who keep the entire 
endowment to themselves more than doubles.  Secondly, the number of 
individuals who now play the lottery also increases relative to a baseline 
experiment where subjects choose between keeping the endowment and 
purchasing lottery tickets.  Taken together, these two effects strikingly diminish 
the transfers which the passive players receive.  In the standard game, the median 
                                                 
1 In their double-blind "random entitlement, exchange" treatment, Hoffman et al. (1994) find that 
close to 80% of all subjects pass on positive amounts.   
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transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators’ endowment.  Once the lottery option is 
present, the median transfer falls to zero. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents a 
series of baseline experiments.  In section III, we report the main results for 
dictator games with extended choice sets.  We also describe a replication of the 
experiments.  We discuss the main findings in section IV.  Section V offers 
concluding comments. 
II.  Baseline Experiments 
Although dictator games appear to be more sensitive to design issues than other 
bargaining games, the majority of dictator game experiments finds that allocators 
pass on between 10% and 30% of their endowment (Bolton, 1991; Hoffman et al., 
1994).  About 20% of all subjects split their endowment 50-50 (Forsythe, 
Horowitz, Savin and Sefton, 1994).  As no strategic interaction between the two 
players takes place, various authors have given these results an equity 
interpretation.  Several factors systematically influence the level of transfers in 
dictator games.  Among them are the social distance between subjects and the 
experimenter (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996), the social distance between 
subjects (Bohnet and Frey, 1999), the relative price of making transfers (Sefton, 
1992), and the justification for the allocation of property rights (Hoffman et al., 
1994; Ruffle, 1998; Schotter, Weiss and Zapater, 1996).  However, even in 
experimental environments that are not particularly conducive to fair behavior 
such as the “gangster game” in Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998) and the 
“taking” institution in Bardsley (2005) and List (2007), many subjects do not 
choose the most selfish outcome.  The experiments presented here offer a new test 
of the robustness of fair behavior in the context of dictator games. 
A.  Standard Dictator Games 
We start by replicating standard dictator game experiments. Our subjects are 
undergraduate students at the University of Zurich without prior knowledge of 
game theory or experimental economics.  The instructions for the dictator game 
were taken from Forsythe et al. (1994) and adapted for our purposes (see 
appendix A).2  Allocators and recipients were assigned to two different rooms to 
guarantee between-subjects anonymity.  We also provide for anonymity between 
                                                
2 These instructions use the "provisionally allocated" language.  Hoffman et al. (1994) show that 
this format yields the same results as an "exchange" frame for dictator experiments with random 
entitlements. 
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 the experimenter and the subjects.  Our procedure differs from the one described 
in Hoffman et al. (1994) in that we do not use a student monitor to collect the 
decision forms.  When students have arrived and are seated, a box containing 
unmarked, sealed envelopes is passed from one subject to the next.  Each student 
takes one of these envelopes out of the box.  During this period, the experimenter 
remains in the front of the room.  Thus, subjects see that the experimenter and the 
other students present cannot know who has picked which envelope.  Each 
envelope contains the written instructions, a proposal form on which allocators 
note s and (1-s), the endowment of 7 Swiss Francs (approximately $5) in cash, 
and two envelopes that are marked with a letter and a number.  This code 
identifies the recipient in the other room.  The only information that allocators 
have about recipients is that this person is also an undergraduate student. 
Allocators first read the written instructions.  These are then repeated orally, 
allowing subjects to ask procedural questions.  Subjects then fill in the proposal 
form and put the form and the cash transfer for the recipient in two separate 
envelopes.  Next, the same box is passed around and subjects put both envelopes 
in the box.  As before, the experimenter remains in the front of the room during 
this period and thus cannot detect who has given how much.  Once all envelopes 
are in the box, it is taken to the room with the recipients where they retrieve their 
envelopes.  This concludes the experiment. 
The design used here is identical to the one we employed in earlier 
experiments (Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee, 1998).  For both experimental 
series, Figure 1 shows the cumulative distributions of the transfers that recipients 
received.  In both series, students transfer on average about 30% of their initial 
endowment.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that both observations come from 
populations with the same mean (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.50) and that the 
distribution of transfers to recipients is the same across these two series 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.53).  These results suggest that our design of the 
standard dictator game experiment is replicable if the same language and 
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parameters are used, indicating that the profile of preferences captured in these 
experiments is stable.3 
Figure 1:  Cumulative distributions of transfers 
in two dictator game experiments. 
(Spring 1998 and present experiments, N=12 and N=29, respectively) 
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3 Dictator games have frequently been replicated.  Forsythe et al. (1994) report replication across 
time.  Hoffman et al. (1994) replicated the Forsythe distribution using identical instructions and 
parameters.  One of the minor differences between our design and the one used by Forsythe et al. 
(1994) is that we present the dictator game in a form that subjects may interpret as a two-stage 
decision process.  Allocators are first asked to propose how much the person in room B is to 
receive.  Then they "decide" how much they wish to keep.  We compared the results of our 
language with the outcome of an experiment that used the original Forsythe et al. (1994) 
instructions and the Zurich parameters (7 Francs, N = 11).  We cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the two set of instructions lead to the same results (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.79, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p=0.91).  In what follows, we pool all three experimental series. 
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 B.  The Lottery Option 
 
In the lottery experiment, we expand subjects’ choice set.  The standard economic 
model of behavior regards choices as determined by opportunity costs.  
Alternative uses of income affect the relative attractiveness of options in the 
choice set and hence guide decision-making.  By providing cash incentives, 
experimenters found a clever way to introduce opportunity costs into laboratory 
decision-making.  The allocator in a dictator experiment is entitled to the funds 
she did not pass on to the recipient, and she may use them at her own discretion 
outside the laboratory.  Thus, transfers in the laboratory are commonly assumed 
to carry similar opportunity costs as (anonymous) transfers in the real world.  One 
implication of this view is that an option which is contained in the original choice 
set (e.g., to make a zero transfer) will not become more attractive if this choice set 
is expanded (Sen, 1997).  This requirement is referred to as the weak axiom of 
revealed preference (WARP) (Samuelson, 1938). 
Standard theory thus makes a simple prediction for dictator games with an 
additional choice such as our lottery: WARP rules out that s or (1-s) increase as 
the lottery is introduced. To understand how the option to play a lottery affects 
choices in the dictator game, we thus need to know how attractive the lottery is. 
To produce a baseline comparison, subjects were given a choice of either 
purchasing one lottery ticket or receiving a certain payment of 7 Francs (for the 
wording of these instructions, see appendix B).  The price of the lottery ticket was 
identical to the allocator’s total endowment (7 Francs).  One group of subjects 
(N=18) faced a 50% probability of winning a prize of 10 Francs and a 50% 
chance of receiving nothing.  For a second group (N=17), the prize was 8 Francs, 
while the probabilities and the zero payoff remained the same.  Not surprisingly, 
most subjects preferred the certain payment of 7 Francs to a gamble with a 
negative expected value.  22.2% (prize 10 Francs) and 29.4% (prize 8 Francs) 
chose to purchase the ticket.  The latter figure perhaps overstates the 
attractiveness of the lottery as some subjects appeared to have trouble believing 
that we would offer them such a miserable gamble.4 
 
                                                 
4 Despite clear oral and written instructions, some subjects did not believe that the prize of the 
lottery was only 8 Francs.  They thought winners would be paid the prize and returned the price of 
the lottery ticket, making the total pay-off 15 Francs.  Two subjects reported this misinterpretation 
in the questionnaire filled in after the session.  Other students may have misunderstood the lottery 
option in similar ways without reporting it.  In subsequent experiments, reported below, we made 
sure subjects understood the lottery payoff.  We have no indication of confusion in these later 
experiments which yield similar results. 
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III.  Extended Choice Sets 
In this section, we report our main results for dictator game experiments where 
the allocator can play one of the two lotteries introduced above (for instructions, 
see appendix C).5  Table 1 provides a first look at the results by listing the mean 
transfers to recipients in the standard and in the extended game, as well as the 
fraction of allocators who keep the entire endowment for themselves (not 
counting those who play the lottery). 
Table 1:  Comparison between transfers in dictator games 
with and without the option to play a lottery. 
Zurich results, endowment 7 Francs (approximately $5) 
Mean transfer
(median) 
% Who keep 
cash 
endowment 
% Who play 
lottery 
Standard Dictator Game 
(N=52) 
2.27 
(2.90) 15.4% -- 
“Lottery” Treatment  
Ticket Price CHF 7, Prize CHF 10
(N=23) 
0.14 
(0) 39.1% 52.2% 
“Lottery” Treatment  
Ticket Price CHF 7, Prize CHF 8 
(N=23) 
0.61 
(0) 39.1% 47.8% 
As is evident from column 1 in Table 1, adding the lottery option to the 
dictator game leads to a substantial decrease in transfers.  While allocators give 
away more than 30% of their endowment in the standard treatment, with the 
lottery, average allocations to recipients amount to about 5%.  Median transfers 
                                                
5 As before, subjects did not need to publicly reveal which option they chose.  The participants 
who wanted to play the lottery enclosed the ticket price of 7 Francs in an envelope marked with 
the letter L.  Those who wished to pass on parts of their endowment to the recipient in the other 
room enclosed their transfer in an envelope marked with the letter B.  The subjects who chose to 
keep everything left the “L” and the “B” envelopes empty. Once subjects had made their decision, 
everyone placed all envelopes in the box, making it impossible for other students and the 
experimenter to discern what subjects had done. 
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 are zero when the lottery option is present.  A single person decided to pass on a 
positive amount in the treatment where subjects faced the gamble with a prize of 
10 Francs.  3 out of 23 subjects made positive transfers when the prize was 8 
Francs. 
These low levels of transfers are the result of two effects.  First, as column 2 in 
Table 1 indicates, the number of subjects who allocate the entire endowment to 
themselves without “investing” in the lottery is one factor leading to low 
transfers.  In the standard treatment, only 15% of all subjects behaved as 
predicted by an income-maximizing model of behavior.  When the lottery option 
is present, almost 40% take their entire endowment.  This difference is 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.024), and the observed 
behavior clearly violates WARP. 
The second reason for the dwindling level of transfers is the increased 
attractiveness of the lottery option.  Table 2 directly compares the number of 
subjects who choose to play the lottery when the dictator game option is present 
and when it is absent.  Without the dictator game, keeping the 7 Francs is mostly 
preferred to playing either one of the low-value lotteries.  The lotteries become 
more popular in the context of the dictator game.  This increase in the number of 
subjects who play the lottery is significant for the gamble with a 10 Francs prize 
(Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.054), but insignificant for the less attractive lottery 
(p=0.246). 
 
 
Table  2:  Attractiveness of lotteries with and without the dictator game option. 
Zurich results, endowment 7 Francs (approximately $5) 
 
 
 
 
% Choosing lottery 
(dictator game 
absent) 
% Choosing lottery 
(dictator game 
present) 
Lottery  
Ticket Price CHF 7, Prize CHF 10 
(w/o DG: N=18; with DG: N=23) 
22.2% 52.2% 
Lottery  
Ticket Price CHF 7, Prize CHF 8 
(w/o DG: N=17; with DG: N=23) 
29.4% 47.8% 
 
 
A.  Replication 
 
How robust are these results across different subject populations?  To what extent 
do our parameters drive the results of the lottery treatment?  To answer these 
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questions, we replicated both the baseline dictator experiments and the 
experiments including a lottery with undergraduate students at the University of 
Pennsylvania.  The instructions and the experimental procedures were kept the 
same.  The allocator's endowment in the Philadelphia experiments was $10, with 
$1 being the smallest unit of exchange.  One difference between the two sets of 
experiments concerns the lottery.  We wondered if the “all-or-nothing” nature of 
the lottery (the ticket price was equivalent to the total endowment) critically 
influenced our results.  Thus, we offered subjects at Penn a lottery with tickets at 
a price of $1 each.  Allocators were free to purchase any number of tickets they 
desired.  Subjects faced a 50% probability of winning a prize of $1.25 per lottery 
ticket that they had bought and a 50% probability of winning nothing.6 
In the baseline dictator game without the lottery option, Penn subjects made 
similar transfers as their Zurich counterparts (mean $2.33), despite the larger 
endowment ($10 in Philadelphia compared to $5 in Zurich).  The Penn results are 
very similar to the findings of other US studies (see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994).  
The fraction of players who behave in an income-maximizing manner is 16.7%, 
again similar to the Zurich results.  The second baseline experiment which offers 
the lottery option and the certain pay-off of up to $10 confirms that, in the 
absence of a dictator game, most students do not see the lottery as attractive.  
11.1% of subjects chose to purchase tickets.  Mean investment in the gamble was 
$0.44. 
Table 3 reports the main results for the Philadelphia dictator experiments with 
the lottery option.   
                                                
6 Allocators won if their identification number and the roll of dice were both odd or both even.  
Thus, one's lottery tickets would all lose or all win. 
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 Table 3:  Comparison between transfers in dictator games  
with and without the option to play a lottery. 
Penn results, endowment $10 
 
 Mean transfer(median) 
% Who keep 
cash 
endowment 
% Who play 
lottery 
Standard Dictator Game 
(N=24) 
2.33 
(2.00) 16.7% 
 
-- 
 
Lottery Treatment 
Ticket Price $1, Prize $1.25 
(N=21) 
0.62 
(0) 47.6% 38.1% 
 
 
Once the lottery is introduced, the level of transfers dramatically declines.  As 
in the Zurich experiments, this is partly due to the larger number of players who 
keep the entire endowment and partly due to an increased attractiveness of the 
lottery.  Almost half the Penn subjects choose to keep the $10 when the lottery is 
available.  This is a significant increase over the standard treatment (Mann 
Whitney U test, p=0.027) and a violation of WARP.  The total dollar amount that 
allocators walk away with (not counting their lottery investments) increases 
despite the fact that there is a third option (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.089).  This 
is a very strong result because the lottery option, which some subjects find more 
attractive than the original choices, naturally leads to a decrease in the amounts 
allocated in the standard dictator game. 
As in Zurich, transfer levels also decline because the lottery becomes more 
attractive in the context of a dictator game (see Table 4).  Average investments in 
the lottery roughly double, while the number of allocators who purchase lottery 
tickets more than triples.  Compared to the baseline results, the latter increase is 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.058), while the former is not. 
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Table 4:  Comparing the Relative Attractiveness of the Lottery.  
Penn results, endowment $10, ticket price $1, prize $1.25  
(w/o DG: N=18; with DG: N=21) 
Dictator game 
absent 
Dictator game 
present 
Mean investment in lottery 
(median) 
$0.44 
(0) 
$0.86 
(0) 
% of subjects who invest in lottery 11.1 38.1 
IV.  Discussion 
Once we expand the set of choices given in the standard dictator game by 
introducing the option to play a lottery, the level of transfers declines markedly.  
This result is robust across different student populations and lottery parameters.  
The low level of transfers is due to subjects more often keeping the entire 
endowment to themselves and, according to some measures, to an increased 
attractiveness of the lottery.  The behavior in these games clearly violates 
standard notions of rationality.  Economic theory assumes that subjects consider 
alternative uses of their experimental income when deciding on how to split the 
pie.  Obviously, outside the laboratory, income earned in the experiment offers 
opportunities that are at least as attractive as the miserable gamble that we 
introduced in the extended game.  Yet, making this additional choice explicitly 
available in the experiment changes subjects’ behavior in unexpected ways. 
The results presented so far are consistent with the principles of asymmetric 
dominance, first discovered by Huber, Payne and Puto (1982).  This theory 
predicts that an alternative x becomes more popular if the set of options is 
enlarged by a choice that is dominated by x.7  Asymmetric dominance is 
important in marketing:  For example, a San Francisco based retail business 
                                                
7 Similar predictions are made by focal point theories.  Dhar and Simonson (1992) have shown 
that focal points are systematically considered more attractive than other alternatives.  One may 
speculate that we created a focal point by presenting choices in a certain sequence (Houston, 
Sherman and Baker, 1989) or by offering more choices that share a specific dimension (two 
selfish, but only one fair alternative). 
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 almost doubled its sales of a particular bread-baking appliance by adding an 
inferior choice to its catalogue (Simonson and Tversky, 1992). 
For our experiments, asymmetric dominance predicts the observed choices.  
Assume that subjects evaluate the alternatives in our treatments on the basis of 
two dimensions: fairness and own income.  In the standard dictator game (when 
comparing fairness and income only), most subjects allocate some funds to both 
purposes.  That is, no alternative clearly dominates the other.  However, with our 
third choice, the lottery, we add a dominated alternative:  From a fairness 
perspective, playing the lottery is equivalent to taking all the cash because the 
recipient does not receive anything in either case.  However, based on their 
expected value, the cash option (mostly) dominates buying the gamble.  
Asymmetric dominance predicts that the dominating choice (the cash option) 
becomes more attractive.  And indeed, this is what we observe. 
Are our results due to asymmetric dominance?  We further tested the 
explanatory power of this theory with a variation of our lottery treatment.  In a 
new experiment, the lottery prizes were not paid to the allocators who bought the 
lottery tickets, but to their recipients.  For this treatment, asymmetric dominance 
predicts that transfers in the dictator game will increase because these transfers 
dominate the expected value of the lotteries. 
Our subjects were undergraduates at Penn.  All experimental parameters were 
kept the same, but prizes were now to be paid to recipients.  Table 5 reports the 
results of this treatment.   
 
 
Table 5:  Transfers in dictator games with and without the option to play  
a lottery, prize of the lottery goes to recipient. 
Penn results, endowment $10 
 
 
 
 
Mean transfer 
$ 
(median) 
% Who keep 
cash 
endowment 
% Who play 
lottery 
Standard Dictator Game 
(N=24) 
2.33 
(2.00) 16.7% 
 
-- 
 
“Lottery” treatment  
Ticket Price $1, Prize $1.25 
(N=21) 
0.71 
(0) 66.6% 4.8% 
 
 
The prediction of asymmetric dominance is not borne out.  Although the 
lottery prize now goes to the recipient, adding the lottery still leads to a 
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substantial decrease in the level of transfers.  Two-thirds of all subjects now walk 
out with all the cash.  Again, this is a significant increase compared to the 
standard dictator game (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.002).  Only one subject chose 
to play the lottery.  Extending the choice set by an unattractive element thus 
represents a powerful framing effect that is not explained by the principles of 
asymmetric dominance. 
A second conjecture is that the observed change in behavior is due to an 
increase in cognitive load.8  Our experimental task becomes more complex when 
the option to play the lottery is present.  Research in psychology has documented 
that subjects tend to use simpler decision-making rules when faced with higher 
cognitive loads.  For example, individuals restrict their attention to fewer decision 
parameters when the task at hand requires greater cognitive effort (Nichols, 
Kenneth and Beach, 1990; Olshavsky, 1979; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993).  
One interpretation of our results is that some subjects ignore the tradeoff between 
income and fairness because it is cognitively challenging to determine the optimal 
split of funds between the three options.  Instead, they focus solely on the income 
dimension, explaining the more selfish behavior that we observe in our data. 
To test the effect of cognitive load on transfers, we replicated the dictator 
game, using a common memory task to increase subjects’ cognitive load.  At the 
end of the instructions for the standard dictator game, we asked subjects to 
memorize ten words and told them we would test their memory at the end of the 
experiment.  To rule out income effects, we made it clear that the performance in 
the memory test would not be payoff relevant. 
Our subjects are undergraduates at the University of Fribourg.  The 
endowment was 10 Swiss Francs.  The results for the standard game and the game 
with the memory task are reported in Table 6.   
Table 6:  Transfers in dictator games with and without memory task. 
Fribourg results, endowment 10 Francs 
Standard Dictator 
Game 
(N=22) 
Dictator Game with 
Memory Task 
(N=24) 
Mean transfer CHF 
(median) 
2.95 
(3) 
3.71 
(5) 
                                                
8 We thank the two referees for pointing out this possibility. 
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 Subjects do not become more selfish when we increase cognitive load. Rather, 
they become slightly more generous.  However, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the two treatments have the same mean (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.15) and 
the same distribution (KS test, p=0.581).  Our results also show that the memory 
task was not trivial.  On average, subjects correctly remembered 4.41 words.  
There is no correlation between the performance in the memory test and subjects’ 
generosity.  We conclude that increases in cognitive load, at least as measured 
here, do not seem to explain the more selfish behavior that we observe in the 
lottery treatment. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
The results presented here document that allocators in dictator game experiments 
choose to make much smaller transfers when their choice set includes the option 
to play an unattractive lottery.  This result is robust across different subject 
populations and lottery parameters.  The decline in transfers is partly due to 
dictators more often keeping the entire endowment for themselves.  For some 
parameters, we also find that the lottery becomes more attractive if it is offered in 
the context of a dictator game. 
Previous research established that dictator game behavior is sensitive to 
variations in experimental design.  However, the effects of earlier variations in the 
design of dictator games are often not difficult to reconcile with theory.  For 
instance, experimenter demand effects (Hoffman et al., 1996) can be interpreted 
as a rational response of dictators who see themselves in a repeated game with the 
experimenter.  Similarly, Eckel and Grossman’s (1996) finding that dictators 
become more generous when they play with “deserving” individuals is consistent 
with models that recognize altruistic motivations.  In contrast, our findings cannot 
easily be reconciled with economic theory because subjects violate basic 
postulates of rational behavior.  At a minimum, the results imply that it is 
problematic to use the transfers observed in the context of the standard game to 
make general statements about individuals’ “taste for fairness.”  In this respect, 
our results are similar to the findings in Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998), 
Bardsley (2005) and List (2007) who observe far less fairness when dictators are 
allowed to take money from their counterparts. 
The extended dictator game poses an interesting question for future research.  
In economics, experiments are built on the premise that monetary payments 
induce rational behavior in the sense that subjects contemplate alternative uses of 
their experimental income before making decisions in the laboratory.  Thus, 
subjects are assumed to behave in the lab as they would in the real world because 
real-world opportunities are constantly present in the form of opportunity costs.  
In light of the results presented here, it seems interesting to investigate whether 
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extending other choice sets can induce violations of rationality.  For example, 
there is now a substantial experimental literature which documents reciprocal 
behavior (for a survey, see Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  Will subjects who were 
treated kindly continue to respond in kind in the presence of extended choice 
sets? 
  
Appendices 
A.  Instructions for standard dictator game 
Welcome!  You are about to participate in an economics exercise.  In addition to 
the $3 you already received for participation, you may earn additional money, 
which will also be paid to you in cash. 
In this exercise each of you will be paired with a different person who is in 
another room.  This is room A, you are the person in room A.  Your counterpart 
in the other room is the person in room B.  You will not be told who the person in 
room B is either during or after the exercise, and the person in room B will not be 
told who you are either during or after the exercise.  Nobody, including the 
experimenter, will ever know what decisions you made during this exercise.  You 
will notice that there are other people in the same room with you who are also 
participating in the exercise. You will not be paired with any of these people. The 
decisions that they make will have absolutely no effect on you nor will any of 
your decisions affect them. 
The exercise will be conducted as follows:  A sum of $10 has been 
provisionally allocated to each pair of participants.  The person in room A can 
allocate the $10 between two different uses.  More specifically, the person in 
room A will propose 
(i) how much of this money the person in room B is to receive.  You can 
allocate all, some or none of the money to the person in room B. 
(ii) how much of this money the person in room A (yourself) is to receive. You 
can allocate all, some or none of the money to yourself. 
The two amounts must add to $10. 
To make this decision, the person in room A will 
1. fill out the original and the copy of the “proposal form”.  The copy of the 
proposal form is for your own records.  The proposal consists of an amount 
that the person in room B is to receive (entered on line {2}), and the amount 
that the person in room A is to receive (entered on line {3}).  The two amounts 
must add to $10.  If you are the person in room A you will have five minutes to 
come to a decision about your proposal.  Do not be concerned if other people 
make their decisions before you. 
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 2. The person in room A then divides the 10 dollar bills according to the proposal 
form.  The person in room A puts the amount that the person in room B is to 
receive in the envelope that is marked with your identification number and 
starts with the letter “B” (e.g., B19).  The person in room A puts the original 
proposal form in the envelope that is marked with your identification number 
and starts with the letter “P” (e.g., P19).  You will keep the money allocated to 
yourself. 
3. Participants will then pass around a box.  Place the “B” envelope and the “P” 
envelope with the proposal form into the box.  Then take the box and bring it 
to the next participant.  The “B” envelopes will then be sent to the person in 
room B. 
4. This concludes this exercise and you may leave. 
Are there any questions? 
 
B.  Instructions used for assessing the attractiveness of the lottery option 
 
Welcome!  You are about to participate in an economics exercise. 
In this exercise you will be asked to make a decision.  You will notice that 
there are other people in the same room with you who are also participating in the 
exercise.  The decisions that they make will have absolutely no effect on you nor 
will any of your decisions affect them. 
The exercise will be conducted as follows:  A sum of $10 has been 
provisionally allocated to you.  You can allocate the $10 between two different 
uses.  More specifically, you will propose 
(i) how much of this money you wish to keep. You can allocate all, some or 
none of the money to yourself. 
(ii) a number of lottery tickets to be bought. You can allocate all, some or none 
of the money to the purchase of lottery tickets. 
The two amounts must add to $10. 
Each lottery ticket costs $1.  At the end of the exercise, we will roll two dice.  
Notice the identification number (on line {1}) of your proposal form.  If the 
identification number is even and the roll of dice is even, you win $1.25 per 
lottery ticket bought.  Otherwise, you win nothing.  If the identification number is 
odd and the roll of dice is odd, you win $1.25 per lottery ticket bought.  
Otherwise, you win nothing. 
 To make this decision, you will 
1. fill out the original and the copy of the “proposal form”.  The copy of the 
proposal form is for your own records.  The proposal consists of an amount 
that you wish to keep (entered on line {2}), and a number of lottery tickets to 
be bought (entered on line {3}).  The two amounts must add to $10.  You have 
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five minutes to come to a decision about your proposal.  Do not be concerned 
if other people make their decisions before you. 
2. Divide the 10 dollar bills according to the proposal form.  Put the money for 
the lottery tickets (if any) and the original proposal form in the envelope that is 
marked with your identification number and starts with the letter “L” (e.g., 
L19).  You will keep the money allocated to yourself. 
3. Participants will then pass around a box.  Place the “L” envelope with the 
proposal form into the box.  Then pass the box to the next participant. 
4. The roll of the dice concludes this exercise. 
Are there any questions? 
C.  Instructions for dictator game with lottery option 
Welcome!  You are about to participate in an economics exercise.  In addition to 
the $3 you already received for participation, you may earn additional money, 
which will also be paid to you in cash. 
In this exercise each of you will be paired with a different person who is in 
another room.  This is room A, you are the person in room A.  Your counterpart 
in the other room is the person in room B.  You will not be told who the person in 
room B is either during or after the exercise, and the person in room B will not be 
told who you are either during or after the exercise.  Nobody, including the 
experimenter, will ever know what decisions you made during this exercise.  You 
will notice that there are other people in the same room with you who are also 
participating in the exercise. You will not be paired with any of these people. The 
decisions that they make will have absolutely no effect on you nor will any of 
your decisions affect them. 
The exercise will be conducted as follows:  A sum of $10 has been 
provisionally allocated to each pair of participants.  The person in room A can 
allocate the $10 between three different uses.  More specifically, the person in 
room A will propose 
(i) how much of this money the person in room B is to receive.  You can 
allocate all, some or none of the money to the person in room B. 
(ii) how much of this money the person in room A (yourself) is to receive. You 
can allocate all, some or none of the money to yourself. 
(iii) a number of lottery tickets to be bought. You can allocate all, some or none 
of the money to the purchase of lottery tickets. 
The three amounts must add to $10. 
Each lottery ticket costs $1.  At the end of the exercise, we will roll a dice.  
Notice the identification number (on line {1}) of your proposal form.  If the 
identification number is even and the roll of dice is even, the person in room A 
wins $1.25 per lottery ticket bought.  Otherwise, the person in room A wins 
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 nothing.  If the identification number is odd and the roll of dice is odd, the person 
in room A wins $1.25 per lottery ticket bought.  Otherwise, the person in room A 
wins nothing. 
 To make this decision, the person in room A will 
1. fill out the original and the copy of the “proposal form”.  The copy of the 
proposal form is for your own records.  The proposal consists of an amount 
that the person in room B is to receive (entered on line {2}), the amount that 
the person in room A is to receive (entered on line {3}), and a number of 
lottery tickets to be bought (entered on line {4}).  The three amounts must add 
to $10. 
 If you are the person in room A you will have five minutes to come to a 
decision about your proposal.  Do not be concerned if other people make their 
decisions before you. 
2. The person in room A then divides the 10 dollar bills according to the proposal 
form.  The person in room A puts the amount that the person in room B is to 
receive in the envelope that is marked with your identification number and 
starts with the letter “B” (e.g., B19).  The person in room A puts the money for 
the lottery tickets and the original proposal form in the envelope that is marked 
with your identification number and starts with the letter “L” (e.g., L19).  You 
will keep the money allocated to yourself. 
3. Participants will then pass around a box.  Place the “B” envelope and the “L” 
envelope with the proposal form into the box.  Then take the box and bring it 
to the next participant.  The “B” envelopes will then be sent to the person in 
room B. 
4. The roll of the dice concludes this exercise and you may leave. 
Are there any questions? 
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